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The Universal in Physics I 1 
The opening paragraph of the Physics sketches succinctly Aristotle's 
general notion of scientific knowledge. First, in fny scientific discipline, to 
know a thing is to know its principles or elements. Secondly, the natural path 
of human knowledge is from thing� that are more knowable for men to things that 
are more knowable in themselves, that is, from concretions to the distinct cognition 
of principles and elements. These two norms are regarded as applying to all 
scientific procedure. Here they are outlined briefly as an introduction to the 
Aristotelian philosophy of nature. 
Up to this point the opening chapter of the treatise is recapitulating standard 
Arietotelianism in quite the expected way. According to the Stagirite's general 
noetic, the origin of human knowledge lies inevitably in sensible things. Sensible 
things are. i�mediately apparent to a man's cognition. From knowledge of the� 
in consequence, all further human knowledge is in one way or another derived .;> All 
sensible things, moreover, are concretions. They are composites both in reality 
and from the viewpoint of the logician. In their own reality, they are composites 
of matter and form (Ph. II l,192b8-193bl8). From the logical standpoint they are 
composites of genera-and species and subject, or, in the special terminology of 
the Categories (5,2all-19), of secondary substance and primary substance. Their 
accidents may, for present purposes, be left out of consideration. 
So far, then, everything is in order in these two initial assertions of the 
Physics. From the two premises, however, a rather surprising conclusion is 
drawn: 5 Lb bf. rwv x.a86A.ou hcf. ru xa.8' ax.a.<H<X od npoUvcu . 4 An unalerted 
reader would be inclined th understand this in English ae ''Therefore one should 
proceed from the universal to the particulars," or "to the individuals." The 
meaning would in this perspective be that one knows the universal first, and 
from the universal proceeds to knowledge of the individual or particular sensible 
thing. Such an understanding of the sentence, of course, strikes at once a 
jarring note. Elsewher\ Aristotle's noetic regularly sees all human knowledge 
originating in the individual sensible things. The universal seems only a further 
and less definite way of considering things that are first known as individual.5 
In the Posterior Analytics (I 2,72a4-5) the universal is explicitly described as 
farthest from sensation, while the individuals, in direct contrast, are closesto 
Even within the Platonic setting, Aristotle maintains that the proponents of the, 
Ideas were actually going from "the things around us" (Metaph. A 9,990bl--0xford 
tr.) to corresponding separate entities of the same name. In an Aristotelian 
con text the notion of going from un.i versals to particulars hardly makes sense o 
As Tannery noted towards the end of the nineteenth century in his discussion of 
this passage, one would expec� from all the analogous passages that Aristotle 
should say just the opposite. The Stagirite should find his point of departure 
in the particular that is immediately attained in sensation, and proceed to the 
general or the universal as his goal. The particular things are first known, 
and in them and through them the universal is reached. One would expect to 
read: "Therefore we must advance from the particular to the general." Yet the 
text clearly states the opposite. It asserts that one should start with the 
general or universal and proceed to the particular. 
The direction the procedure has to take, accordingly, is stated unequivocally 
in this text. It is from universal to particular. But exactly what is meant by 
"universal" and "particulars" in the present setting? Whatever they may mean, the 
statement as a whole cannot very well against an Aristotelian �ackground imply 
that human knowledge starts with non-sensible objects. Procedure from universals 
to concrete s'nsible things would not be any more acceptable to Aristotle than 
to Whitehead. The first step in the investigation of the passage, therefore, 
will be to determine exactly what is meant by "universal" and by "particulars" 
in its context. 
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P. 3 
Nor does it seem helpful to distinguish from the usua11aense of the universal "the other and less frequent sense of 'concrete whole.'" The universal, as 
first known in the sensible things from which human cognition takes its origin, 
is always a concrete whole. It is "something composed of this particular 
formula and this particular matter treated as universal" (Metaph. Z 10,1035b29-30), 
"the compound of both taken universally"(ll,1037a6-7; Oxford tr.). All the 
universals that are predicated of sensible things will be composites or compounds 
of this nature. In its regularly used sense, accordingly, the universal ie a 
"concrete whole." 
Finally, what about Roes's suggestion that "universal" in the present text 
means a generic nature, instead of the "true nature" of the universal that 
appears in the specific characteristics�1 At one place in the Metaphysics 
(H l,1042al5) "universal," in the sense of specific nature, seems contrasted 
with genus. But does this imply that the generic universals are not universals 
in the true sense? If the universals were principles, Aristotle (Metaph. B 3, 
998bl7-19) argues, the highest genera would fill this role. In Mure's trans­
lation of the Posterior Analytics (II 19,100al6-b3), in fact, the specific 
nature "man" is a "rudimentary universal," while the widest of the generic 
natures are the "true universals": "for though the act of sense-perception 
is of the particular, its content is universal--is man, for example9 not the 
man Callias. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and 
the process does not cease until the indivi,aible concepts, the true universals, 
are established: e.g. such and such a species of animal ia a step towards 
the genus animal, which by the same process is a step towards a further 
generalization." In a note to the translation Mure states that the highest 
genera, the categories, are "par excellence universal'' (n. 2). 
Actually, in the Greek1�ext, both the specific and the generic traits are merely called "universal." No adjective is added in either case to distinguish 
what would be a "rudimentary" universal from a "true" universal. Species and 
genera alike seem regarded as universal in the full sense of the term. In the 
above text from the Posterior Analytics, the specific nature that is perceived 
in the individual man is the starting point of the process. The next step 
is the establishing of the genus "animal," and so on in ascending scale until 
the highest genus is reached. According to this way of regarding the process 
of cognition, the object is first known in its specific nature and then 13 gradually in its more generic traits. On the other hand, the Greek commentators 
were inclined to interpret in the opposite direction the process signalized 
in the opening chapter of the Physics. The confused object initially known 
appeared in its more generic traits, as an object at a distance will first 
appear as a body, then as something alive, and then as a man. In either case, 
however, the notion of universality seems to be fully satisfied. Both the 
generic and the specific natures are predicated of subjects and belong in 
these subjects as identical with each of them. 
What, then, is the exact sense of "universal" in the opening passage of the 
Physics? The context describes it as a "whole," a whole that contains a 
number of things as its parts. In it these parts are confused (�Y¥KEX�1{'�>. 
What are these parts? Whatever they are, they will function as the 1(0t-rl'el(01�ioi. towards which the process of knowledge advances. If what is meant by parts in thie context can be determined with satisfactory clearness, they should allow one to see the nature of the concretion formed by them. They should provide the key to the meaning of the universal as the notion is found used in the present passage. 
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are more kn o w abl e in the mse lve s but are not immediately knowable to men. In 
natural philosophy these are found to be entirely formless matter and the first 
form received by it. The matter and the form are contained in the sensible 
things that human cognition first knows. They are fused together in the sensible 
thing, as genus and differentia are in the definition. From a study of the 
originally known concrete whole they are reached and expressed in separate 
notions through the procedure of natural philosophy. Just as the form is the 
actuation of the matter, moreover, eo is the diff eren tia the actuation of the 
genus (Metaph. H 6,1045a23-35). The analysis of definition into genus and 
differentia is in fact used in the Metaphysics (Z 12,1037b8-1038a35) as an 
approach to the study of the composition of matter and form in sensible substances, 
and the p roble m dealt with in their regard is characterized (b9-10) as helpful 
for the inquiries about substance. In the meaning of a concrete whole analyzed 
into its logical elements, therefore, the illustration of the word and the 
definition i.s quite what should be expected in Aristotle as an approach to 
the analysis of a physical whole into elements or principles or causes. 
Rose (Aristotle's Physics, pp. 457-458), however, states that this 
interpretation "seems impossible." Ross, it will be remembered (supra, P• 2), 
had identified the "universal" in this context as generic knowledge, for 
instance the knowledge of something as an "animal." The procedure, then, 
would be from the general characteristic as the starting point to the specific 
traits as the principles or elements, for example from "animal" to "horse" or 
"cow." In this understanding of the procedure, the genus cannot be one of the 
elements reached by the scientific inquiry. As the starting point, it is 
expressly contrasted with the elements that are reached as a goal. Hence it 
seems impossible for the elements in this illustration to be the genus and 
the differentia that make up the definition. 
What alternative does Ross offer? He acknowledges (ibid.) that the analysis 
of a genus into its species will not do here. That is not at all the business 
of definition� but rather of logical analysis. But, Ross claims, the distinguish­
ing of the various senses of an ambiguous term will serve the present purpose, 
and will provide the only interpretation able "to illustrate, even remotely, 
what is is put forward as illustrating, viz. the transition from the recognition 
of the generic nature of an object to the recognition of its specific nature" 
(p. 458). "Circle" in Aristotle is in fact an ambiguous terme Besides a 
geometrical circle it is also used for an epic cycle (APo. I 12,77b33), and 
had still other meanings in everyday speech. Tannery•s--ri'rt. cite, P• 4719 n.5 ) 
suggestion that the k��·{K°"'"" distinguished by the definition are the 
circumference of the circle and the surface limited by the circumference, both 
referred to indifferently in Greek mathematics by the word "circle," seems to 
be in essentials the same as that of Ross. 
There need be little question about the remote way in which this interpretation 
would allow the illustration to function. There is no immediate problem hara 
about the ambiguous use of terms. Where such a problem has an essential 
bearing upon his theme, Aristotle is usually not slow in bringing it to the 
fore. To use definition as an illustration, and without any warning understand 
by it solely the definition of ambiguous terms, does seem farfetched. It is 
not paralleled in Aristotle's use of the analysis of definition in the 
Metaphysics (Z 12) as an approach to the analysis of sensible things into 
matter and form. Moreover, the definition of an ambiguous term, insofar as 
it can have a definition9 does not in fact distinguish its various senses, 
any more than the definition of a genus distinguishes its different species. 
A definition of "healthy," or "medical," or "good," would merely provide a 
vague description that could extend to all the various senses. It would not 
distinguish the meaning that"healthy"has when applied to food from the meaning 
it has when applied to color. One may reject, correctly, the possibility of 
interpreting the illustration in the sense of the division of a genus into its 
species; but by the same token a division into the various meanings of an 
ambiguous term becomes inapplicable. 
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The second illuetration is that children at first call all men fathers 
and all women mothers, and only later distinguish the one from the other. The 
relation,of the one to the other,parallels the relation between the components 
of a definition in the first illustration. "Man" and"woman" are more general, 
"father" and "mother" are more specific. Does the illustration mean, however9 
that a child commences with a specific knowledge of his father as father, and 
wrongly applies that knowledge in its fullness to men in general? Fourth 
century Greek children may have been precocious. But to credit their first 
impressions with full specific knowledge of what it means to be a father, is 
somewhat beyond the bounds of credibility. Does the illustration mean, then, 
that they first have the general impression of "man," express this incorrectly 
by the word "father," and only later get the specific notion to which the 
word "father" is restricted? 
In the rout simile at the end of the Posterior Analytics (II 19,lOObl-3), 
the procedure of human knowledge is clearly taken to be from the specific 
nature "man" through the generic nature "animal" to still higher genera, until 
the highest genus of all, the category, is reached. In one of a number of 
indiscriminate singulars that appear before human sensation the notion "man" 
is grasped, and then the other singulars are aligned with it one after another 
until the species is sufficiently established. Further, men are viewed in a 
panorama with horses, cows, dogs, cats, and so on, and in a corresponding way 
the genus "animal" is reached. Animals are viewed along with plants in a still 
wider picture, and the notion "something living" is attained as a broader generic 
nature. The procees continues until the highest genus, "substance," is isolated. 
Thie ia the way the Porphyrian tree has been climbed by generations of students 
of Aristotelian logic from Boethius on. On1�he other hand, the familiar illustration used by the Greek commentators went in the opposite direction. 
In seeing a distant object, one recognized it first asabody;then on getting 
cloeer to it one saw that it was something alive, on still greater proximity 
that it was a man, and finally that it was the individual Socrates or Alcibiades. 
The direction was from genera to species and singulars. 
Each of the two ways of proceeding seems to have its legitimate place. From 
the logician's viewpoint, the singulars are first grouped into species, and then 
the species into genera, until the highest genus is reached. Epistemologically9 
however, a thing seems known first under the vaguest general notion of "something," 
and then distinguishing traits are gradually seen in it, as in the case of the 
object first perceived at a distance. Which of the two viewpoints is applicable 
here? Or are both on the same footing, as far as the present illustration is 
concerned? 
c. The text reads as though "the one and the other" or "each of the two" 
(£1'�TEf<>V ) into which the originally known confused whole is distinguished 
must be "men and fathers" or "women and mothers." Neither the more specific 
notion "fathers" nor the more generic notion "men" seems to be the concrete 
whole that is first known. They seem represented as concepts distinct from 
each other, the /t'ot\)'£/(�cr� that emerge from a differentiating knowledge of 
the objects initially grasped through sensation. The starting point is neither 
the one nor the other as distinct notions, but rather a vague object in which 
both are fused and neither is differentiated. Whether the child first becomes 
accustomed to call the vaguely known object "Dad" or "man" or an y other name� is 
beside the point. It is known first as a confused whole, and only later are 
the concepts of it as "father" and as "man" differentiated. 
Interpreted in this way, the second illustration continues to press home the 
point made by the first. The l(o,;iJ•/ic-.""T« are the distinct generic and specific 
notions that were not differentiated in the initially known whole. l(�Vl-'e���T� 
here cannot mean singular sensible things, but universal notions that set up the 
species and genera. The confusedly known object that serves as the starting 
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point is, however, universal in regard to them all. It contains them by being 
predicable of each, for each of the components is a "known object" or "something," 
or whatever one wishes to call the initially grasped whole in all ite vagueness. 
With each of them is it identical, one by one, while remaining a unitary notion 
in itselfo In this way it fully and univocally satisfies the Aristotelian 
requirements for universality, namely "as containing many things by being 
predicated of each, and9 while a unit, by being them all severally"(Metaph. A 26, 
1023b30-31; supra, p. 2). The starting point, accordingly, is neither the 
lowest species nor the highest genus, but an as yet undifferentiated object 
that ie universal to both. It may therefore be referred to simply as "the 
universal," and the genera, differentiae, and species contained under it be 
called without hesitation its K<:l"'r K o<rTo\ 
IV 
What Aristotle has been saying, then9 is that the confused object initially 
known in sensation is universal in regard to its parts or components, and that 
from it one proceeds to the distinct knowledge of the components. That is 
what he says. But what does it mean, philosophically, in the present context? 
Sometimes one can determine satisfactorily enough what a Greek thinker is 
saying, and still encounter difficulty in assessing ite correct philosophical 
meaning. In the opening chapter of the Physics, what is the exact bearing of 
the statement that one must proceed from the universals to their distinct 
components? It is brought forward as an introduction to a natural philosophy 
that proceeds from concrete sensible things to the matter and form that are 
the principles or causes or elements of these things. Is it merely a comparison? 
Does it just mean that as in the case of a universal you analyze a whole into 
its parts, so in natural philosophy you analyze the initially known s�nsible 
concretion into its distinct components? Possibly. 
There are, however, aome difficulties in accepting this view, plausible as 
it may appear at first sight. The notion of proceeding from the universal to 
its components is not introduced as a comparison, but as a consequence. It 
is introduced by 6 t6--wherefore. Because we first know concretions, we 
have to proceed from universaleD Such seems to be the sequence of thought. 
It appears to mean that the concretions from which the procedure of natural 
philosophy commences will somehow remain universal in regard to their principles 
and elements. Hence would arise the necessity of the elaborate explanation 
through the examples of the name and the definition, the fathers and mothers 
and the men and women. 
Secondly, the principles reached by the procedure in natural philosophy 
have to be in themselves more knowable than the concretions from which the 
procedure started. This requirement is stated expressly in the opening 
chapter of the Physics. The principles reached by the procedure are formless 
matter and its firet form. But in itself the matter is unknowable (Metaph. 
Z 10,1036a8-9). As a principle for scientific knowledge of sensible things 
it will have to appear in a way that renders it more knowable than the 
observable things themselves. This cannot be the way in which it ie present 
in the singular thing, where, taken ap�0t from the form, it manifests no 
actuality or determination whatsoever. Yet it is knowable by analogy 
(Ph. I 7,191a7-12). As the bronze is to the statue and the wood to the bed9 
so is it to the substantial actuality of any body. What does this mean? It 
means that the basic concept upon which the concept of formless matter is 
elaborated, is the concept of a body, of the concretion originally known in 
sensation. It is the universal and vague concept of something corporeal. In 
this way the subject that rec�ives the substantial form is represented as a 
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corporeal substrate that lacks all the determinations given by the categories. 
The notion is formed by taking the universal concept of "substrate" as seen in 
things like a bed or a statue, and by adding to the concept the negation of any 
formal determination. In this way it remains basically the concept of a body, 
the concept of the concretion that was first known in sensation. In regard to 
it the concept of the concretion remains universal. The basic substrate of 
bodies is conceived as something corporeal. But it itself, as one of the 
���·fl(lil.rr� that come under this universal, is likewise represented in the status 
of a universal. As universal it can serve as a principle for scientific know­
ledge. It can be used universally as a principle for understanding all bodies. 
Accordingly it is more knowable in itself than the bodies it serves to explain, 
even though these bodies are more knowable to us. 
The same considerations hold correspondingly for the formal principle of 
sensible things. It cannot be represented just in itself. Even though it is 
contrasted with matt�r, it has to be represented as something material. As the 
shape of a statue is related to the bronze and the shape of a bed to the wood, 
so the intelligible content of a substance is represented in relation to the 
formless matter that multiplies it in the many individuals of a species. The 
concept is basically that of a shaped or formed body9 with the negation of all 
substrate added aa its distinguishing feature. The concept of something 
corporeal remains basic to it. The vague notion of the object originally 
known in sensation remains universal to it. 
Viewed in this perspectiv�, both the principles that are reached by the 
analysis of sensible things in natural philosophy come under the object 
initially known in sensation, aa under a universalo Aristotle is saying that 
the procedure of natural philosophy is from bodies as known universally in 
ordinary sensation to principles that are conceived and known under further 
determinations of the original universal concept. One is proceeding from the 
first known universal to a distinct cognition of notions that come under it 
but are as yet undifferentiated in it, somewhat as the definition of a circle 
differentiates the notions signified confusedly by the word "circle," and 
children afterwards distinguish the notions of "father" and "man" that were 
undifferentiated in their earlier concept. What Aristotle has in mind, if 
this interpretation is correct9 is that the confused object first grasped in 
sensation remains universal in regard to all further knowledge. The origin 
of all human knowledge in sensation would mean that all other objects have 
to be known basically in terms of concrete sensible things, with the necessary 
refinements and negations added. Thia would safeguard the Aristotelian 
conception of scientific knowledge from any atomism in the epistemological 
sense. The ultimate principles reached by the scientific procedure do not 
have to be given the status of individually known building-blocks from which 
the universe is constructed. Rather, any "correspondence theory" of truth 
that one might wish to attribute to Aristotle would have to refrain carefully 
from placing a photographic correspondence between the ultimate principles 
themselves and the concepts by which they are known. The concepts are not 
at all immediate replicas of them, but are elaborations of the confused object 
originally known in sensation and contained under it as under a universal. 
v 
The above interpretation gives the "universal" in the opening passage of 
the Physics the regular and univocal meaning that it has elsewhere in Aristotle. 
It also finds considerable importance in the use of the notion for the 
explanation of philosophical procedure at the beginning of natural philosophy, 
an importance that justifies the amount of space given it in the condensed 
summary of scientific method. The interpretation, it may be objected, uses 
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